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IN 'THE SUPREME, COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THALDA L. BAKER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ARCHIBALD H. COOK and MAY 
K. COOK, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 8550 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover 
f.or personal injuries sustained while she was employed 
to do general housework .at the ho1ne of the defendants. 
On the morning of August 20, 1953, the defendant May 
l{. Cook employed the plaintiff to do household cleaning 
for her, and shortly after noon of that day, the plaintiff 
came to the home of the defendants to begin work. The 
first work that was required of her was to wash ground 
floor windows on the outside of the apartment occupied 
by the defendants. For this purpose the defendant May 
K. Cook furnished plaintiff a ladder, which plaintiff 
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took outside to begin work. Shortly thereafter the plain-
tiff re-entered the kitchen of the defendants' residence 
and comp}ained that she had been injured, showing Mrs. 
Cook a cut on her left leg. The foregoing are all of the 
undisputed facts involved in this action, but there are a 
number of other circumstances regarding which the par-
ties are not in ~agreement. 
Plaintiff's .testimony was to the effect that after she 
had set up the ladder outside the window the defendant 
~fay K. Cook looked out and suggested that plaintiff 
turn the ladder .around the other way ··with the steps away 
from the building (Tr. 18, 97). 
Plaintiff denied that Ex. D-2± \\as the ladder that 
she used on the day in question (Tr. 101, 147). Plaintiff 
then testified that she had n1ounted the ladder to begin 
work when she heard a c-racking noise, and the next thing 
she knew, she was down on the ground on her hands and 
knees ( Tr. 18-19). She then \vent b.aek into tl1e defend-
ants' apartment and infor1ned the defendants of what 
had occurred. She also testified tl1at after the accident 
the rnetal portions of the ladder \rere so bent tl1at it 
would not stand up, (Tr. 22) and that "~hen she put her 
h.and on the ladder to help herself up the n1et.al bent 
under her hand (Tr. 20-21, 103-105). 
The defendant ~fay K. Cook testified at tl1e trial that 
on the day in question she gave the plaintiff the ladder 
introduced in evidenee as Exhibit D-24 to use and then 
left the apartment "\\rhere she and the other defendant 
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lived. When she returned the accident had already oc-
curred, and she knew nothing about the manneT in which 
plaintiff was injured ( Tr. 108-109). She also testified 
that the ladder (D-24) was in substantially the s1ame 
condition at the time of trial as it had been after the 
accident and injury to plaintiff, and that both she and 
other ele1aning women had used the ladder before the 
accident and continued to use- it after the accident 
( Tr. 109-110). 
After .all of the evidence had been received, the court 
submitted the matter to the jury upon genel}al instruc-
tions and the following special verdict: 
"PROPOSITION No. 1: The defendants were 
negligent in furnishing to the plaintiff a defective laddeT 
which was not reasonably suited for the us.e to which it 
had to be put by Mrs. Baker in doing her work. 
"PROPOSITION NO. 2: The plaintiff was negli-
gent in mounting the ladder afte:r she knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that it 
was defective and not reasonably suited for the use to 
\vhich it had to be put in doing her work. 
"PROPOSITION NO. 3: The negligence of de-
fendants, if found in Proposition No. 1, was a substantial 
factor in proximately causing injury to Mrs. Baker. 
"PROPOSITION NO. 4: The negligence of the 
plaintiff, if found in Proposition No. 2, was a. substantial 
factor in proximately causing injury to herself. 
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"QUESTION NO. 5: As shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in this case, what amount of money 
would fairly and adequately reoon1pense Mrs. Baker for 
such injuries, if any, as were proximately caused by her 
fall from the ladder¥ 
A. General damages, if any 
B. Loss of earnings to date, if any 
Total Damages 
The jury 'vas instructed that they should answer 
the first four propositions "True," '~False" or "Unable 
to S.ay." All of the jurors answered propositions 1 and 3 
"True," and seven of the1n answered numbers 2 and 4 
•'1Jnable to Say." Thereupon the trial court ruled that 
the defendant had failed in her burden of proof as to 
plaintiff's contributory negligence and sent the jury out 
to eonside·r proposition ~ o. 5. The jur~~ found general 
da1nages in the amount of $5,000.00 loss of earnings in 
the .an1ount of $2,500.00 for total of $7 ,500.00. To tllis 
<unount the court added the sun1 of $1,818.~0 being medi-
ral exp·ense to which the plaintiff l1ad testified. 
After the jury had retired to eonsider the Inatter, 
the court on 1nortion of counsel dis1nissed the case as to 
the defendant Archibald H. Cook. This appeal is prose-
euted by the other defendant :\lay I~. Cook, fron1 the 
judgment rendered against her. 
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STATEMEN'T OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
FINDING OF LOSS OF EARNINGS. 
POINT II. 
THE OOURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING PRO·POSITIONS 
ONE TO FOUR INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S FAILURE 
TO ANSWER PROPOSITIONS TWO AND FOUR WAS 
ERRONOUS. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF 
THE ,CASE. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE JURY AFTER 
THEY HAD RETURNED THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSI-
TION NO. 5 WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
FINDING OF LOSS OF EAR.NINGS. 
The only evidence as to the plaintiff's earnings was 
plaintiff's own testimony to the effect that her average 
yearly earnings for the three years immediately pre-
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b t $6'000.00, or "about ceeding the injury was "a ou 
Twenty-Three Hundred a year." (Tr. 12-13). Plaintiff 
.also stated that she would produce records to substantiate 
this statement (Tr. 13). It appeared after the noon re-
cess that she was not able to locate any records at her 
home (Tr. 106). When counsel inquired of the Federal 
Bureau of Internal Revenue it appeared that the records 
in question were not available there either (Tr.160). The 
only .additional evidence having any bearing on the plain-
tiff's income was her own statement that she had been 
unemployed for the three months immediately prior to 
going to work for the defendants (Tr. 13, 86). On such 
a state of the record any findings as to loss of earnings 
is based solely on conjecture and supposition. Plaintiff's 
employment history shows nm11erous changes in employ-
ment (Tr. 5-11), and even aillnitting that in the past 
.average earnings had been ""about $2,300.00 a year," in 
view of her own staten1ent as to having been unemployed 
for three n1onths preceding the accident such yearly 
income figures are without probative -v-alue as to her loss 
of income since th·e accident. 
As said by this Court in Seybold r. l~nion Pac. Ry. 
Co., 121 Ut. 61, 239 P. (2d) 17 4: 
"We h'ave no disagreen1ent ,,·ith the time-
honored rule that if there is substantial evidence 
to sup~port the conclusion of the trier of the fact 
it will not be disturbed on revie\v. But that means 
more than a 1nere scintilla of evidenee. See 9 
·whigmore 3rd Ed., Sec. ~49-± . •.. If there is any 
substantial con1petent evidence upon "Thic11 a jury 
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acting fairly and reasonably could make the find-
ing it should stand. But if the finding is s:o 
plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that 
no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make 
the finding, it cannot be S'aid to be suppor.ted by 
subs1tantial evidence." 
To the s~ame effect is Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Ut. 98, 
239 P. (2d) 193. 
Of course if it is determined that as a matter of law 
the evidence does not support the finding of the jury, 
it was error for the· trial court to submit the question 
of loss of earnings to the jury. The defendant excepted 
to the court's instruction No. 14 covering this issue 
(Tr. 168). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING PROPOSITIONS 
ONE TO FOUR INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY. 
Defendants' contention that the submission of these 
propositions to the jury vvas error is based on two sepa-
rate grounds: First that Proposition No. 1 ,as drawn 
assumes facts in dispute; Second that by giving the jury 
three alternatives in their answer, the Court permitted 
them to answer the questions without deciding them. 
We shall consider our first. ground of objection. 
Proposition No. 1 states that defendants were: negligent 
"in furnishing to the plaintiff a defective ladder ... " The. 
question as to whether the ladder was defective was the 
crux of the case, and by the use of the word "in" the 
proposition assumes that the ladder furnished was de-
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fective, and that defendants were negligent. A similar 
situation was before the court in Mass v. W. R. Arthur & 
Co., 239 Wis. 581, 2 NW (2d) 238, where the trial court 
submitted a question to the jury as to whether a driver 
of an automobile was negligent "with respect to (a) in 
attempting to overtake and p~as.s the car ... at the inter-
section ... " The court held that by the use of the word 
"in" the special interrogatory assumed that the car was 
p·assing at the inters.ection, and since this was one of the 
questions in issue under the evidence, suc:h interrogatory 
was erroneous ·as runounting to a comment on the evi-
dence. This decision was cited with approval in Huffman 
v. Reinke, 268 Wis. 489, 67 N.W. (2d) 871, where the court 
said that where a question as framed assumes that one 
of the parties was negligent, it should not be given. 
In Foemmel v. llfueller, 255 Wis. 277, 38 NW (2d) 
51 0, the special verdict given by the c,ourt \vas : 
"Question 3. 
•'Iuunediately preceding and at the time of the 
accident involved here, "-ras the defendant Charles 
l\iueller negligent in respect to ~\... . . 
"B. In stopping on the high,Yay in the place 
he did with:out placing burning fusees or flares 
upon the road near his standing truck~ 
"C. In failing to haYe clearance lights burn-
ing upon the truck!" 
Speaking of the special question.s, the eourt said: 
"They are defective be·c.ause in Question 3-B 
by the use of the word 'in' just preceding the word 
'stopping' the 1neaning of the question is sucl1 that 
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it assumes Mueller did fail to place burning fusees 
or flares while stopping on the highway. Inste.ad, 
the court should have submitted the direct ques-
tion whether 'Mueller was negligent in stopp~ing 
without placing' such fusees or flares. 
"Likewise Question 3-C is defective be~cause 
by using the word 'in' just preceding the words 
'failing to have clearance lights burning' the mean-
ing is such that the question assumes Mueller did 
fail to have such lights. There should have been 
submitted the direct question whether Mueller 
was negligent in failing to have clearance lights 
burning .... " Citing 1lfaas v. W. R. Arthur & 
Co., supra. 
The situation here is similar to one that was before 
the court in Thoresen v. Grything, 264 Wis. 487, 59 N'V 
(2d) 682. This was a case involving a rear end collision 
between a truck and a car driven by one Grything, and 
was submitted to the jury on a special verdict. The court 
said: 
"The real issue with respect to the conduct of 
Grything was not submitted to the jury. It might 
be inferred that the jury in considering its answer 
t~o the question concerning his control of his car 
might have concluded that there was no sudden 
stopping. The inference might be permitted if the 
court had instructed the jury with resp.ect to 
Grything's duty as to stopping. 
" 'The questions should be fr~amed so far .as 
practicable to secure the most direct consideration 
of the evidence as it applies to the issues made by 
the pleadings and supported by the evidence.' 
Liberty Te.a Co. v. L~aSalle Fire, Ins. Co., 206 Wis. 
639, 238 N.W. 399." 
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As in the Grything case cited above, the re.al issue 
with respect to the conduct of the defendant M:ay K. Cook 
was never submitted to the jury. The questions which the 
jury should have decided were firstly, whether the ladder 
(Ex. D-24) was the ladder used by plaintiff, secondly, 
whethe;r it was defective, and thirdly, whether the de-
fendants knew, or should have known that it was defec-
tive. Proposition No. 1 as fr.amed by the court ignores 
all of these matters and assumes that the ladder was de-
fective and that the defendants were negligent. 
As said by this court in Sta'rtin v.ltladse·n 120 Ut. 631, 
237 P. ( 2) 834, "The instructions should not be susceptible 
of misconstruction as either comments on the evidence 
or arguments for either side of the case." 
As to the second ground of defendant's objection 
to the submission of the first four propositions to the 
jury the defendant respectfully submits that as drawn, 
the propositions enable the jury to evade their duty 
and still return answers to the questions. 
The purpose of special interrogatories and special 
verdicts is to give the parties and the court an oppor-
tunity to 'ascertain 'vhether the jury l1as understood and 
applied the law to the proven facts, Elio L·. Akron Tra·nsp. 
Co., l-t-7 Oh. St. 363, 71 N.E. (2d) 707. The defendant sub-
Inits that the propositions given to the jury by the trial 
court fall short of this criterion. They ru.~ not "so clear 
and concise as to be readily understood by the jury, and 
... so framed as to call for a sin1ple categorical ans"\Yer." 
53 An1. Jur., page 7±1, Sec. 1070. See also Scott r. 
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Cismadi, SO Oh. Ap. Rep. 39, 74 N.E. (2d) 563, holding 
that each interrogatory submitted to a jury should be 
limited to a single direct and controverted issue of fact 
and should be so stated that the ansvver will necessarily 
be positive direct and intelligible. 
Although counsel h.as done extensive research on this 
1natter we have been unable to find at single case where 
an appellate court has passed on special interrogatories 
or a special verdict framed as were the court's Proposi-
tions one to four in this case, using the third .alternative. 
With the growing use of special verdicts by the trial 
courts of this state the question is one of importance 
upon which this Court should pass for the guidance of. 
the trial courts, and members of the bar. 
The matters embraced in Propositions 2 and 4 were 
issues vital to the success or failure of plaintiff's case-
the matter of contributory negligence and proximate 
cause. To submit such questions to the jury with an 
jnstruction that they may ansvver that they are "Unable 
to Say" is to invite members of the jury to shirk their 
sworn duty to pass upon the evidence and decide the 
facts. ·under the court's instructions they may answer 
all of the propositions and still not decide the issues. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S FAILURE 
T'O ANSWER PROPOSITIONS TWO AND FOUR WAS 
ERRONOUS. 
Researeh shows that the numerical weight of author-
ity in the country is to the contrary of the above proposi-
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tion. However, in most states there have been statutes 
enacted, or rules of procedure promulgated, which re-
quire such a decision. Without a careful ·analysis of the 
statutes or proce;dur.al rules under which decisions were 
rendered, it is impossible to determine whether they are 
in point under the 1Jtah Rules of Procedure. 
Courts in Texas have uniformly held in accord with 
defendant's contention. An early case 'vas Goggan t·. 
Wells ]?argo & Co. (C.C.A. Tex. 1920) 227 S.W. 246, 
which holds that when the jury answered several material 
special issues 'Unable to Answer' this amounted to no 
answer at all. It was error for the court to enter a judg-
ment on such verdict. The court in its opinion cites as 
statutory authority for such holding ..~._\rticle 1988 
Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes, 1914. Tbis section 
simply provides: "The verdict shall comprehend the 
whole issue or all the issues submitted to the jury-." The 
statute has been carried forward and is .a part of Rule 
290 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule reads: 
" ..... ~ verdict is a 'vritten declaration by a jury 
of its decision, con1prehending the whole or all 
the issues sub1nitted to the jury, and shall be 
either a general or special Yerdict, as directed, 
" .. hich shall be signed by the foren1an of the jury. 
"A general verdict is one " .. hereby the jury 
pronounces generally in fav·or of one or n1ore 
partie~s to thP suit upon all or a11y· of the issues 
submitted to it. A special Yerdict ·is one "Therein 
the jury ~inds the facts only on issues made up 
and subn11tted to the1n under the direction of the 
court." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
Since the foregoing rule is not substantially differ-
ent from the provisions of Rule 49 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the decisions of the Te~as courts are in point 
as to lTtah procedure, the Utah Court having never 
passed on the question. 
The rule laid down in the Wells Fargo case, supra, 
has been uniformly followed in Texas. In Lakewood 
Heights Co. v. McCuist,ion (CCA Tex. 1921) 226 S.W. 
1109, it was held: 
". . . when a cause is submitted on special 
issues, such issues must be determined by the jury. 
In such case the court is powerless to decide any 
issue so submitted. Differently stated, the court 
in a jury trial in which special issues are sub-
mitted to the jury can only decide such issues as 
have not been submitted and have not been re-
quested to be submitted to the jury." citing cases. 
In Nolan v. Smith, (CCA Tex. 1942) 166 S.vV. (2d) 
750 the court said, quoting fro1n Adams v. Houston N at'l 
Bank, Crex. Com. App.) 1 S.W. (2d) 878: 
'' 'The constitutional right to a jury trial doe~s 
not include those cases where, under the evidence:, 
there is no controverted issue of fact for deter-
mination. In such a case there is nothing which 
the court could submit to a jury and there is there-
fore no error in discharging the jury previously 
impaneled and in rendering judgrnent in accord-
ance with the undisputed facts.' " Citing also to 
the same effect the case of Traders Etc., Co. v. 
Weatherford, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 124 S.W. (2d) 
423. 
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Going on, the court quoted from the case of Copeland v. 
Brannan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 70 S.W. (2d) 660: 
" 'There was no finding of the jury on some 
of the material questions presented, and having 
submitted these issues to the jury, and the jury 
not having found on them, the court was not au-
thorized to supply such findings, nor to !ender 
judgment on the issues answered, but should have 
refused to accept the same ; and the jury should 
have been returned for further consideration, and, 
in c.ase they could not agree on such material 
issues, a mistrial should have been declared. The 
court had no authority to render judgment on the 
verdict, absent any finding on such material issue 
submitted.' " 
The case of Texas E1nployers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Horn 
(CC ... t\.. Tex.) 75 S.W. (2) 301, also cited the above lan-
guage with approval. In Denison v. Brown, (CCA Tex. 
1915) 172 S. ~T. 725, questions "~ere submitted to the jury, 
and one remained unans,Yered. The trial court concluding 
that the unanswered question 'Yas repetitious of one of 
those answered and that therefore the factual question 
had been decided, then rendered judg1nent. On appeal 
this was reversed, the court holding that the fact of an 
agreement on one question and inability to .agree on the 
other 'vhen they both covered the srune factual situation 
conclusively sho,ved that the jury did not correctly· under-
stand the questions. Ren1anded for a ne,v· trial. 
To the effect th-at 'vhere the jury fails to answer 
special issues essential to the judgn1ent, a mistrial should 
be declared, are.: Dato v. Geo. VV. ArJnstrong Co. (C. of 
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li. Tex. 1924) 260 S.W. 1024; Cranston v. Gautier (CCA 
Tex. 1926) 284 S.W. 620; Wheat v. Lancaster, (CCA Tex. 
1926) 284 sw 629. 
Spe-cial questions must be plain and unambiguous 
and call for findings on questions of f.act which are con-
clusive of th'3 real issue. involved in the case. Farr v. 
Haggerty, 273 ~fich. 547, 263 NW 739; Gilbert v. Stick-
ley, 204 Mich. 342, 169 N.V\T. 866; JJ!Iiller v. James Mc-
Graw Co., 184 Md. 529, 42 A. (2d) 237. 
In the case of Tober v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 210 
:J'fich. 129, 177 N·w 385 the ~{ichigan Court held: 
"A failure of the jury to answer a question 
containing an affirmative fact essential to and 
of some controlling force. in reaching a verdict 
has been held to result in a mistrial." citing cases. 
"The court should have instructed the jury it was 
their duty to answer the special questions with-
out permission to return divided answers or sug-
gestion as to reporting how they stood if unable 
to agree .and thus avoid a decision.'' 
In that case after the jury was instructed they returned 
and asked further instruction as to the manner in which 
they must answer the special questions. The court told 
the1n that if all were unable to agree they should indicate 
how many voted one way .and how many voted the other 
and return the special verdict. 
A slightly different approach to the problem was 
used by the court in Laf11ayette v. Bass, 122 Okla. 182, 
252 .P. 1101 \vhere it -vvas said "Unable to Say" amounted 
to a fajlure to .ans·w·er, and when the court without ob-
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jection from the parties accepted these answers and pro-
ceeded to enter judgment on the basis thereof, it amount-
ed to a withdrawal of those issues from the jury. This, 
the appellate court held, the trial judge had authority 
to do under the. Oklahoma rules of procedure. The judg-
ment w.as ·affirmed. Such would be the rule in Utah also, 
since Rule 49 Rules of Civil Procedure sp.ecifically pro-
vides that failure by the party to demand submission of 
an issue to the jury is a waiver of his right to a jury 
determination on such issue. In this case, however, de-
fendant requested submission to the jury of the issues of 
contributory negligence and proximate cause embodied in 
Propositions 2 and 4 by her requested instructions 2 
(7) and 11. The authorities cited by defendant under 
Point IV sho,ving the necessity for instructions to cover 
all of the issues in the case are also controlling here. 
Under this theory, the trial court failed to instruct the 
jury on all issues of the case, "~hich is reversible error, 
under the holdings of this court. 
The l\{assachusetts eourt in Cote 'l;. Luce, 2~5 :Jfass. 
123, 113 N.E. 777, held that failure of the jury to agree 
on answers to special interrogatories does not amount 
to a finding of fact. "'l,hese issues ... remain undeter-
Inined." and in Stone r. Orth Chevrolet Co .. ~S-± ~Iass. 
525, 187 N.E. 910, the court said that "?hile it is discre-
tionary to require a special verdict, and no exception may 
be taken to the court's granting or refusal to grant the 
sa1ne, if a special verdict is ordered .and the ans,,~ers 
given do not dispose of all 1naterial issues in the case it 
is reversible error to di rert a verdict thereon. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF 
THE ·CASE. 
It has been the defendant's contention from the out-
set of this ease that plaintiff's injuries were due solely 
to her own negligence in the manner in which she used 
the ladder furnished her by the defendant. Whether she 
slipped and fell from the ladder, or whether she faile·d 
to set the ladder up properly and it tipped over, the de-
fendant of course does not know. However, the defend-
ant has contended from the beginning that the ladder 
(Ex. D-24) did not collapse; that is, it did not break down 
due to a failure in construction. To prove such conten-
tion, defendant herself testified th.at the ladder had been 
used since the accident, both by herself and others (Tr. 
109, 110, 116, 117). The witness Beth Christensen testi-
fied that she had used the ladder both before and since 
the accident to plaintiff, (Tr. 123, 125). Defendant pro-
duced the ladder in court on the theory that an inspection 
of it would be sufficient to eonvince anyone that the 
ladder did not break down; that it did not bend as claimed 
by the plaintiff. By requested Instruction No. 2 the de-
fendant attempted to have these matters submitted to the 
jury, but such instruction was refused by the court and 
the jury did not have the opportunity to pass on the ques-
tion of whether (Ex. D-24) was the ladder which plain-
tiff used; and whether the ladder used, (whether it was 
D-24 or not) collapsed. The court's instructions erron-
eou:-~ly assumed that the only negligence with which plain-
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tiff could have been chargeable is in using a ladder which 
she knew or should have known was unsafe. The instruc-
tions :completely ignore the fact that plaintiff m~ay have 
so set up the ladder that it tipped over when she got on 
it. This matter is controlled by the decision of this Court 
in Startin v. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P. (2d) 834, where 
it was said : 
"It w,as the duty of the trial court to cover 
the theories of both parties in his instructions. 
:&Iartineau v. H~anson, 47 U. 549, 155 P. -132; I\Ic-
Donald v. U.P. Ry. Co., 109 U. 493, 167 P. (2d) 
685." 
When the instructions are considered as a whole as 
they must be, Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 l~t. 312, 67 P. 
(2d) 654; Redd v. Airway llfotor Coach Lines, 10-± lTt. 9, 
137 P. (2d) 374; they do not measure up to the standard 
laid down by this court in Startin v. 1lfadsen ~supra. X or 
does the trial court's procedure comply 'nth the rule 
laid down by this Court in the case of In Re Hanson's 
Will, 50 lTt. 207, 167 P. 256, "There it \Yas said: 
"In this case the special verdict eovered eYery 
issue, and therefore a general verdict "Ta.s unneces-
sary. In case a special verdict does not cover 
ever~T issue~ tl1en, as a 1natter of eourse~ a general 
verdict is neeessary to authorize .a judgment on 
the verdict." 
Since, the sperial Yerdict subn1itted by tl1e court did 
not cover all of the issues in the ease, the rule laid down 
by the llanson, ease, supra, requires that the trial cour.t 
also sub1nit. a general verdict to the jury. 
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POINT V. 
THE COUR.T'S QUESTIONING OF THE JURY AFTER 
THEY HAD RETURNED THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSI-
TION NO. 5 WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Pages 176 to 182 inclusive of the transcript cover 
questioning of the jury by the court. This occurred ,afte.r 
the jurors had returned their answer to proposition No. 
5, and after counsel for the defendant had raised the 
question that merely because the jurors were "Unable to 
say" did not necessarily mean that they had not been 
convinced by the evidence. The defendant respectfully 
submits that a re.ading of this portion of the transcript 
is sufficient to show that the trial court by adroit cross 
questioning led the jurors to the conclusion that they 
were not confused by the propositions, but were merely 
unconvinced by the evidence. The court used leading 
questions (lines 9, 14, 22 page 177; lines 11, 24 page 179; 
lines 29-30 page 181). By commenting on questions which 
counsel for the defendant wished to have asked, the court 
nullified the effect of such questions before asking them. 
(Tr. 180). 
It should be noted that the first answers of the 
jurors Gold (Tr. 176-177) and Dunn (Tr. 178-179) indi-
cated that the questions had confused them, but that after 
the tri.al judge cross examined these jurors and led them 
by his questions they then concluded that the questions 
had not confused them. Thereafter the other jurors 
questioned went along with this statement. 
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It should also be remembered that the jurors had 
had a long and trying day. The events which occurr.ed in 
those pages of the transcript took place after 9 P.M.; 
(Tr. 175) after the jury had been out for more than 
six hours (Tr. 164). After so long a deliberation and 
at a rather late hour of the night, when the presiding 
judge cross examines and questions the jurors in the 
manner shown by the transcript herein, the result is a 
foregone conclusion. Having once stated their position 
the jurors would not easily recede from it, particularly in 
the face of the comments and questions of the judge. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of sumn1ary, appellant urges that the judg-
ment of the District Court is in error for the following 
reasons: 
1. That there is no evidence to support any find-
Ing of, or judgn1ent for, respondent's claimed loss of 
earnings. 
2. That the special verdir.t subnritted to the jury 
was improper in that far.ts in dispute 'vere assu1ued by 
the language of the verdirt. .. AJso that the sperial \erdiet 
was in error in per1nitting the jurors to return the answ~er 
"Unable to Say'' to the questions posed. 
3. That the jury having HnS'\Yered t'\vo of the ques-
tions in the special verdict ''Unable to S.ay·~ tJ1e trial 
court should have declared a mistrial, since such answers 
amount to no finding at all on the questions so ans'\\rered. 
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4. That the trial court failed to instruct the jury on 
the defendants' theory of the 0ase. 
5. That the trial court committed reversible error 
in its examination of the jurors after they had returned 
their verdict. 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully 
urges that the judgment of the District Court he reversed 
and that the case be remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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